Solutions
Banks
For a bank the question is rarely whether tokenization is interesting. It is whether the controls are evidenceable to somebody who will ask for the mechanism, not the intention.
What it changes
- Controls you can demonstrateTenant isolation in three independent layers, append-only ledger and audit enforced by the database, and maker-checker bound to a hash of what was approved.
- Segregation of dutiesConflicting roles detected and surfaced rather than discovered during an examination.
- An audit trail that fails rather than merely recordsHash-chained so tampering is detectable, and append-only at the database so it is refused.
What it includes
RBAC and ABACOne pure authorisation function, failing closed, with tenant boundary checked before permission.
Step-up authenticationRequired within a short window for the actions that move money.
Retention and replayDecisions replayable under the policy version that governed them.
What this deployment does not do
Stated plainly
No external penetration test or smart-contract audit has been completed on this deployment. Both are launch gates in our own specification and neither is satisfied.
See it against something real.
Bring an instrument you are actually considering. Structuring it is the only way to judge whether the model fits.